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Asymmetric Arms Control and Strategic Stability: 
Scenarios for Limiting Hypersonic Glide Vehicles1 
Can arms control incorporate emerging technology? Other articles in this special issue 
identify potential risks emerging technologies pose to stability and how they are 
intertwined with international politics. This article looks ahead to explore how arms 
control might reduce those risks, but in order to do so we must update concepts of 
both arms control and strategic stability. Building on Thomas Schelling and Morton 
Halperin’s seminal study into the relationship between strategic stability and arms 
control, this article offers an original framework- asymmetric arms control- for 
incorporating new technologies, which is then used to identify six scenarios for arms 
control of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs). It concludes that arms control can 
potentially reduce the risks to strategic stability associated with emerging 
technologies by incorporating dynamism into arms control design. Ultimately, 
asymmetric arms control can best contribute to strategic stability by crossing domains 
and reflecting the cross-domain nature of international conflict, and the framework 
has potential application to emerging technologies beyond HGVs.
Keywords: Arms control, strategic stability, hypersonic glide vehicles, emerging 
technology
Word Count: 8,867
1 I am grateful to James Acton, Francis Gavin, Brendan Rittenhouse Green, Michael Horowitz, Vince 
Manzo, Rupal Mehta, Amelia Morgan, Brad Roberts, Caitlin Talmadge, and the anonymous reviewer 
for their feedback on this article. I am also particularly grateful to the Carnegie Corporation of New 
York for sponsoring the Project on Strategic Stability Evaluation (POSSE), which provided the 
opportunity to develop and socialize these ideas, and to POSSE participants for their suggestions. 
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Introduction 
Can arms control incorporate emerging technology? Relations between the United 
States and Russia are more dangerous than at any point since the end of the Cold War, 
and emerging technologies, such as hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), will 
exacerbate risks of misperception, military competition, and inadvertent escalation.2 
Other articles in this special issue highlight the potential threats emerging 
technologies pose to international politics and stability. This article offers an original 
framework3 for examining how arms control might evolve to incorporate these 
emerging technologies, asymmetric arms control, defined as cooperative measures of 
self-restraint in which states make non-like-for-like exchanges, either quantitatively 
or qualitatively. Arms control was, in the past, seen as a key element of promoting 
strategic stability, international cooperation, and peace. There have been, to be sure, 
critics of this view. A new challenge, however, has emerged that is of concern for 
both advocates and sceptics of arms control – how to manage the emergence of new 
and varied technologies that threaten peace and stability, but which are hard to define 
as part of one domain. 
Strategic stability offers a useful lens for addressing these conceptual, technological, 
and political challenges. During the Cold War, Thomas Schelling and Morton 
Halperin4, along with others, argued that one objective of arms control was to 
strengthen strategic stability, defined as arms race stability and crisis stability.5 Arms 
control was about the management of weapons rather than disarmament6 and provided 
2 See, for example, Aaron Miles, ‘The dynamics of strategic stability and instability’, Contemporary 
Security Policy, 35/5 (2106), pp. 423-437. 
3 Lieber and Press highlight the need to challenge existing models of arms control, whereby, ‘In the 
past, many arms control advocates believed that arms cuts reduced the incentives for disarming strikes; 
whether right or wrong in the past, that assumption is increasingly dubious as a recipe for deterrence 
stability today.’3 Keir Lieber and Daryl G. Press, ‘The New Era of Counterforce: Technological 
Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence’, International Security, 41/4 (2017), pp. 9-49.
4 Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: The Twentieth 
Century Fund, 1961).
5 For a particularly useful discussion on the evolution of the concept of arms control in relation to 
disarmament, along with controversy around the term ‘strategic stability’, see Benjamin Wilson, 
‘Insiders and Outsiders: Nuclear Arms Control Experts in Cold War America’, Dissertation submitted 
to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September 2014.
6 See, for example, Jeffrey D. McCaulsand, ‘Arms control and the Dayton accords’, European Security, 
6/2 (1997), pp. 18-27: ‘ “Arms control” refers to agreements between two or more states to limit or 
reduce certain categories of weapons or military operations in order to diminish the possibility of 
conflict…. “Disarmament” is normally imposed by a state or a group of states at the conclusion of 
war…. This distinction is important because, while an arms control regime is maintained by a harmony 
of interests among the participants, disarmament requires external pressure to insure implementation 
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transparency that could reduce risks of misperceptions during a dangerous crisis. This 
approach linking arms control and strategic stability has been largely ignored in 
recent scholarship, however, which focuses on three debates within arms control. 
First, critics of the strategic stability approach argue that historically arms control has 
been a technical counting exercise, and it needs to adopt a more holistic and political 
approach.7 Second, a select group of scholars have engaged with questions about the 
formality of arms control, and whether or not arms can contribute to international 
security by becoming more flexible and moving away from legally-binding treaties.8 
And finally, policy circles offer numerous recommendations for future arms control 
agreements, but few of them examine the underlying political and stability factors that 
shape arms control.  
This article begins by building on Schelling and Halperin’s classic thesis linking arms 
control and strategic stability, and redefines the underlying principles of arms control 
as crisis stability, arms race stability, and an arms control norm. Second, the article 
identifies three new challenges to strategic stability which thus far have eluded arms 
control efforts- different perceptions of strategic stability, the increasingly asymmetric 
nature of stability, and the potential of emerging technology to upset stability, 
specifically HGVs.9 Finally, the article outlines the asymmetric arms control typology 
and includes six scenarios for HGV arms control as demonstrative examples. This 
study offers an original contribution to scholarship into the impact of emerging 
technology on international politics. It highlights the need for dynamism in any arms 
control framework to promote strategic stability in a rapidly changing era of 
geopolitical and technological uncertainty. Indeed, given the increasingly cross-
and compliance…. It is also critical to recall that arms control is a ‘method or means’ to achieve the 
“objective” of improve security. But arms control is not an objective by itself.’ pp. 18-19.  
7 Nancy Gallagher, ‘Re-thinking the unthinkable: Arms control in the twenty-first century’, 
Nonproliferation Review, 22/3-4 (2015), pp. 469-498; and Neil Cooper and David Mutimer, ‘Arms 
control in the 21st Century: Controlling the Means of Violence’, Contemporary Security Policy, 32/1 
(2011), pp. 3-19. 
8 Sarah Kreps, ‘The Institutional Design of Arms Control Agreements’, Foreign Policy Analysis 
(2016), pp. 1-21; and Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘21st Century Arms Control Challenges: Drones, Cyber 
Weapons, Killer Robots and WMDs’, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 13/3 (2015).  
9 On related themes, see Horowitz, Michael C., ‘When Speed Kills: Autonomous 
Weapons Systems, Deterrence, and Stability’, Journal of Strategic Studies (2019).
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domain nature of deterrence10 and asymmetries in nuclear, conventional, cyber, and 
other capabilities, arms control, too, must cross domains and explore asymmetries. 
Revisiting Strategy and Arms Control 
In their seminal 1960’s text, Strategy and Arms Control, Schelling and Halperin link 
arms control to strategic stability as a means of managing the arms race and avoiding 
limited or accidental war. From this perspective, arms control can be defined as the 
management of weapons, rather than their elimination. Schelling and Halperin’s 
definition from the Cold War resonates today and is worth quoting at length: 
[A]ll the forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the 
interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, 
and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it. The essential 
feature of arms control is the recognition of the common interest, of the 
possibility of reciprocation and cooperation even between potential enemies 
with respect to their military establishments.11 
This approach emphasizes that arms control is a tool for achieving strategic aims 
through cooperative restraint rather than military competition. For Schelling and 
Halperin, the objectives of arms control include strengthening strategic stability, 
reducing the incentives for conflict, reducing the damage if conflict occurs, and 
economic savings. Focusing on the first objective, arms control can strengthen 
strategic stability by reducing the risks of arms races and crises, and by promoting an 
arms control norm. To better understand if arms control can strengthen strategic 
stability in an era of geopolitical and technological change, it is worth revisiting these 
traits of strategic stability.  
Looking to arms race stability, states often pursue costly new military technologies 
due to uncertainty and, ‘a constant fear on either side that the other has developed a 
dominant position, or will do so, or will fear the first to do so, with the resulting 
danger of premeditated or pre-emptive attack.’12 Other articles in this special issue, 
for example, discuss the potential for artificial intelligence to increase uncertainty, 
10 See, for example, Austin Long, ‘Deterrence: The State of the Field’, International Law and Politics, 
47 (2015), pp. 357-377; and Dima Adamsky, ‘Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of 
Strategy’, IFRI Proliferation Paper, 54 (2015). 
11 Schelling and Halperin, p. 2. 
12 Ibid., p. 37. 
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leading to a ‘scale-up’ in order to offset the offense-defense balance.13 This 
competition can be further driven by lack of information about an adversary’s military 
development and as a result exaggerate capabilities, such as the ‘missile gap’. Arms 
control can contribute to arms race stability by placing reciprocal limits on 
capabilities, increasing transparency into an adversary’s actual capabilities and force 
posture, and reducing the likelihood of success in the event of military adventurism, 
according to Schelling and Halperin. 
With regards to crisis stability, arms control reduces incentives for pre-emptive and 
premeditated attack because it can ‘alter the character of the weapons themselves’14, 
‘reduce the general expectation of war…reduce the urgency to pre-empt’15, and 
‘reduce the likelihood that an attacker would achieve surprise.’16 Arms control 
offered a means of living with uncertainty about an adversary’s intentions not only by 
reducing capabilities, but also by increasing transparency and reducing 
misinformation.17 To be clear, this is not intended to inflate the influence of arms 
control on broader geopolitics, but rather, borrowing from Trachtenberg, to ‘influence 
the process’ as much as possible away from misperception and escalation and towards 
transparency and predictability.18 Caitlin Talmadge reinforces this point, whereby, 
‘although technology could directly generate some future inadvertent escalation risk, 
the more likely role for technology is as an enabler of escalatory policies states want 
to undertake for other strategic and political reasons.’19 For Schelling and Halperin, 
arms control had the potential to mitigate that ‘enabling’ role. 
Schelling and Halperin do not refer to an arms control norm, but do refer to ‘traffic 
rules’20 or general practices of restraint, which I include here as an objective of arms 
control in contributing to strategic stability. Legally-binding arms control agreements 
are a widely practiced behavior to promote cooperation over competition in 
13 ‘The Scalaing of the Offense-Defense Balance, with Implications for Artificial Intelligence’, this 
issue.
14 Ibid., p. 10
15 Ibid., p. 11.
16 Ibid., p. 12, italics in original. 
17 Ibid., p. 13. 
18 Marc Trachtenberg, ‘The Past and Future of Arms Control’, Daedalus, 120/1 (1991). 
19 Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Emerging Technology and Intra-War Escalation Risks: Evidence from the Cold 
War and Implications for Today’, Journal of Strategic Studies (2019).
20 According to Schelling and Halperin, abstaining from unilateral military action or even limited war 
itself are a type of arms control.
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international security to the point of being a norm or ‘rules of the road’.21 Indeed, 
nearly every member of the United Nations is party to at least one arms control 
agreement, whether it be the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty. Cooper and Mutimer define the true benefits from arms control as 
‘controlling means of violence’, whereby the substance of agreements was not 
necessarily the most important part of arms control, but rather, ‘the extent to which its 
practices contribute to a transformatory politics that produces demilitarized 
communities where such control is no longer needed.’22 These agreements therefore 
serve both practical and symbolic functions of manifesting ‘particular ideas of how 
international relations should be managed.’23 
Even during the Cold War Schelling and Halperin’s arguments about arms control 
and strategic stability faced criticism, and some of their points have not held up well 
over time. For example, Brendan Green and Austin Long argue that the 1972 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Interim Agreement enabled the United 
States to engage in a qualitative arms race, although it was tied to quantitative parity 
with the Soviet Union.24 But rather than discard this approach, linking arms control 
and strategic stability, we can instead examine new challenges to strategic stability 
and develop an updated concept of arms control accordingly. 
New Challenges for Arms Control and Strategic Stability 
In the Eye of the Beholder
The current era of geopolitical and technological uncertainty presents at least three 
new challenges to strategic stability. First, evolution of the post-Cold War 
environment, along with historical work into Cold War dynamics, revealed that 
strategic stability means different things to different states. Indeed, some states may 
not always value stability as much as others, if at all. Returning to contemporary U.S.-
Russia strategic competition as an example, the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review 
(NPR) highlighted the increasing uncertainty in the strategic environment. 
21 See, also, Harald Muller and Carmen Wunderlich (eds.), Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms 
Control (London: University of Georgia Press, 2013). 
22 Cooper and Mutimer, p. 12. 
23 Andrew Butfoy, ‘The evolving framework of arms control’, Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, 48:1 (1994), pp. 37-51.
24 Brendan R. Green and Austin Long, ‘The MAD Who Wasn’t There: Soviet Reactions to the Late 
Cold War Nuclear Balance’, Security Studies, 26/4 (2017), pp. 606-641.
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Historically the United States was tied to a definition of strategic stability as 
‘survivable second strike’, but the NPR offered a new definition, which included non-
nuclear capabilities that present a threat to nuclear systems.25 This definition 
continues to lean towards the importance of capabilities in the strategic balance, but 
has expanded beyond nuclear forces to consider space, cyber, and other new 
technologies as part of the strategic equation. Additionally, the NPR acknowledged 
that arms control can play a role in promoting strategic stability, albeit options are 
currently limited, such as force limitations and risk reduction.26 
Russia, however, takes a more ‘integrative’27 and ‘holistic’28 approach to strategic 
stability to include non-nuclear capabilities, information operations, and broader 
political factors. This approach is decidedly asymmetric to play to Russia’s 
advantages. In his translation of Russian strategic experts Chekinov and Bogdanov, 
Dmitry Adamsky defined asymmetry as, ‘of a systemic and complex nature and 
incorporates (sic) political, diplomatic, informational, economical, military and other 
efforts.’29 Russia’s current reliance on nuclear weapons largely stemmed from the 
breakdown of its conventional forces with the end of the Cold War and economic 
collapse in the 1990’s. Its 2000 Military Doctrine increased reliance on nuclear 
weapons, but as a ‘temporary solution’ while it worked to rebuild its conventional 
forces.30 Kristen ven Bruusgaard described the concept as ‘strategic deterrence’, 
which: 
...is conceived much more broadly than the traditional Western concept of 
deterrence. It is not entirely defensive: it contains offensive and defensive, 
nuclear, non-nuclear and non-military deterrent tools. These are to be used in 
times of peace and war- making the concept resemble, to Western eyes, a 
25 Heather Williams, ‘Strategic Stability, Uncertainty and the Future of Arms Control’, Survival, 60/2 
(2018), pp. 45-54.
26 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, p. 72-73. 
27 Nikolai Sokov, ‘Russian Perspectives on Nuclear Disarmamand and Post-Nuclear World’, in Nik 
Hynek and Michal Smetana (eds.), Global Nuclear Disarmament: Strategic, Political, and Regional 
Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2016). 
28 Adamsky. 
29 iBid., p. 34. 
30 Sokov, p. 217. Current Russian nuclear doctrine states, ‘The Russian Federation shall reserve the 
right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass 
destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian 
Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.’ 
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, December 2014
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combined strategy of containment, deterrence and coercion- using all means 
available to deter or dominate conflict.31
Russia’s approach incorporates elements of both soft and hard power, political as well 
as military aspects, such as what Adamsky referred to as the ‘informational-
psychological struggle.’32 
This analysis demonstrates that strategic stability is in the eye of the beholder. 
Therefore, whether or not states have an interest in arms control depends on their 
national interests and perception of strategic stability, which is much more complex 
than previous models of stability and arms control. 
Quantitative and Qualitative Imbalances 
A second challenge for strategic stability and arms control is the asymmetric nature of 
conflict, as mentioned above from the Russian perspective. Asymmetry is 
increasingly important in the present strategic environment, defined by its cross-
domain nature, wherein deterrence requires, ‘countering threats in one area (such as 
space or cyberspace) by relying on diff rent types of capabilities (such as sea power 
or nuclear weapons, or even non-military tools, such as market access) where 
deterrence may be more effective.’33 Emerging technologies allow additional 
opportunities for asymmetry across domains; Ben Garfinkel and Allan Dafoe 
introduce the concept of ‘OD scaling’ (offense-defense), whereby ‘growth in 
investments will favor offense when investment levels are sufficiently low and favor 
defense when they are sufficiently high.’34 And Erik Gartzke demonstrates the 
potential for asymmetries in technology to extend the duration and nature of 
conflicts.35 Consideration of these differences in qualitative and quantitative scale of 
capabilities do not readily align with Cold War models of strategic stability and arms 
control. These imbalances are reflected not only in capabilities, but also in broader 
factors such as geography, because of some states’ proximity to a perceived threat and 
31 Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, ‘Russian Strategic Deterrence’, Survival, 58/4 (2016), p. 7. 
32 Adamsky, p. 24. This is often mistranslated to equate to American and Western definitions of 
cyberwarfare, but it entails a variety of ‘digital-cognitive factors’ and the ‘regulation of information 
(cyber) space in a much broader sense than the West.’ p. 29. 
33 Long pp. 366-367.
34 Ben Garfinkel and Allan Dafoe, ‘How Does the Offense-Defense Balance Scale?’ Journal of 
Strategic Studies (2019).
35 Erik Gartzke, ‘Blood Robots: How Remotely Piloted Vehicles and Related Technologies 
Affect the Politics of Violence’, Journal of Strategic Studies (forthcoming).
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respective attitudes towards agreements and cooperation.36 Strategic stability no 
longer rests solely in the nuclear realm, and states will operate in other domains where 
they have a perceived advantage. This presents a challenge for arms control that is 
based on like-for-like exchanges.
As Green and Long demonstrated, however, stability through arms control is not a 
purely quantitative exercise, but also qualitative. States could use arms control as an 
opportunity to make qualitative improvements. Or, conversely, some states are 
negatively affected in arms control more so than others, resulting in an imbalance or 
instability that could actually increase risks. If the 1972 SALT Interim Agreement 
had set parity in number of submarines, for example, this would have been felt 
asymmetrically by the United States and Soviet Union. The Soviet Union would have 
had to make significantly larger cuts to its nuclear forces than the United States and, 
in all likelihood, would not have signed the Agreement. To take a hypothetical 
example outside of the U.S.-Russia context, if the Netherlands joined the 2017 Treaty 
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), this would have an asymmetric 
impact compared to a state such as Mexico joining. As a NATO member and base for 
dual-capable aircraft, the Netherlands would have to reject NATO’s nuclear mission, 
cease any activities that could be construed as ‘assistance’ to nuclear deterrence 
postures, and ostensibly withdraw from NATO in its current form in order to comply 
with the TPNW. Mexico, on the other hand, would not have to make any changes as it 
does not rely on nuclear deterrence. 
Emerging Technology- Hypersonic Threats to Strategic Stability 
And third, emerging technologies, such as HGVs, may inspire arms races or crises, 
undermining Schelling and Halperin’s principles for strategic stability. Schelling and 
Halperin’s observation on the impact of emerging technologies could be equally true 
today: 
The present race seems unstable because of the uncertainty in technology and 
the danger of a decisive break-through. Uncertainty means that each side must 
be prepared to spend a great deal of money; it also means a constant fear on 
either side that the other has developed a dominant position, or will do so, or 
36 Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff (eds.), The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control 
(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999)., p. 15. 
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will fear the first to do so, with the resulting danger of premeditated or pre-
emptive attack.37 
These fears and uncertainties resonated in the 2018 U.S. NPR focus on the impact of 
emerging nuclear and non-nuclear technologies due to, ‘the potential for technological 
breakthroughs in the application of existing technologies, or the development of 
wholly new technologies, that change the nature of the threats we face and the 
capabilities required to address them effectively.’38 Many of these emerging 
technologies also are dual-use in nature- either civilian and military or nuclear and 
conventional- as highlighted by Tristan Volpe’s study of how technologies such as 
additive manufacturing interplay with the security dilemma.39
One such technology with the potential to change the nature of threats is HGVs, 
which launch a missile into the atmosphere, which then re-enters on a glidepath and 
can be steered to a target with a high degree of maneuverability in order to evade 
defenses. They are capable of speeds of Mach 5 or faster, can support heavy payloads, 
and eventually are intended to have inter-continental range.40 Re-entry glide vehicles 
are not counted under any existing strat gic arms control agreement and likely can 
carry both nuclear and conventional warheads. HGVs are discussed here not because 
they are the most threatening of emerging technologies, but rather to demonstrate the 
challenges these technologies potentially present to strategic stability and the 
increasing amount of uncertainty around their impact on arms races, crises, and 
international politics more generally. 
In terms of arms race stability, the United States, Russia, and China are already 
competing in the development of HGV technology. In the 2002 NPR, the United 
States announced plans for advanced conventional weapons, the Conventional Prompt 
Global Strike (CPGS) system, to be part of a new strategic triad, along with defenses 
and military innovation.41 By the 2020’s, the United States is expected to have a 
‘spearhead’ HGV force to conduct operations such as targeted strikes and evading 
37 Schelling and Halperin, p. 37. 
38 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, DC: 2018).
39 Tristan Volpe, ‘Dual-Use Distinguishability: How 3D-Printing Shapes the Security Dilemma 
for Nuclear Programs,’ Journal of Strategic Studies (2019).
40 iBid., p. 213. 
41 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review.  
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anti-access/area-denial.42 Russia’s hypersonic Project 4202 included a successful 
2016 test and its new heavy ICBM, the Sarmat, is expected to carry the HGVs with up 
to 24 per missile. 43 China has conducted at least seven HGV tests to date, the most 
recent using a DF-21 ballistic missile with a range of 2,200 km although it is expected 
to eventually transition HGVs to longer-range ballistic missiles, such as the DF-31 
that can reach 8,000km.44 Competition in HGVs seems inevitable and all three states 
will feel obligated to continue in developing and deploying the technology rather than 
risk falling behind in a perceived ‘HGV gap’. 
With regards to the potential impact of HGVs on crisis stability, scholarship focuses 
on three risks. First, in a series of reports and articles, James Acton and other experts 
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace demonstrated the risks of 
‘entanglement’, to include, ‘dual-use delivery systems that can be armed with nuclear 
and non-nuclear warheads; the commingling of nuclear and non-nuclear forces and 
their support structures; and non-nuclear threats to nuclear weapons and their 
associated command, control, communication, and information (C3I) systems.’45 This 
entanglement of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities increases the risks of inadvertent 
or unintentional escalation. As argued by Acton elsewhere, HGVs also present a 
particularly unique risk of entanglement because of their dual-use nature, creating 
‘warhead ambiguity’ and ‘destination ambiguity’ given their dual-use nature, 
maneuverability, and lack of transparency in targeting.46 
Second, HGVs and other advanced conventional weapons in high numbers may 
embolden states to believe they can conduct a disarming first strike. Lieber and Press 
recently argued that during the Cold War and through to the present day states have 
sought capabilities to achieve as much. They argue that emerging technologies will 
42 Corentin Brustlein, ‘Conventionalizing Deterrence? U.S. Prompt Strike Programs and Their Limits’, 
IFRI Proliferation Paper, 52 (2015). 
43 Pavel Podvig, ‘Summary of the Project 4202 development’, Russian strategic nuclear forces blog, 
June 16, 2015. 
44 Joshua Pollack, ‘Boost-glide Weapons and US-China Strategic Stability’, Nonproliferation Review, 
22/2 (2015) pp. 155-164. 
45 Alexey Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin, Petr Topychkanov, Tong Zhao, and Li Bin, Russian and Chinese 
Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Risks, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace (2017), p. 1. 
46 Acton.  
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make nuclear arsenals less survivable47 and echoed Cold War arguments, such as 
those by Bernard Brodie, that despite technological improvements states would 
always perceive, ‘considerable advantage in striking first, and it is up to us to see that 
such an advantage is at least minimized for the opponent.’48 Weapons such as HGVs 
may give states the perception that they could conduct a disarming first strike against 
an adversary’s nuclear forces. 
And finally, advances in conventional weapons technology occur in parallel with calls 
for the United States and Russia to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. While such a 
change in posture is unlikely in the immediate future based on Washington and 
Moscow’s doctrines, any future shift whereby states increase reliance on conventional 
weapons will complicate strategic stability.49 Some analysts suggest the best way to 
strengthen strategic stability and reduce incentives for nuclear use is to reduce the 
number of nuclear weapons50; however, if this comes at the expense of increasing 
reliance on conventional weapons, that may weaken stability and increase risks. 
Again, these pressures would be heightened in a crisis scenario if states possessed 
large HGV arsenals but fewer nuclear weapons by shifting the ‘burden of escalation’ 
onto an adversary in a ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ scenario.51 What these risks suggest is that 
HGVs are potentially destabilizing in some situations, and competition may already 
be a reality. 
Dynamic Stability 
Existing arms control models and concepts of strategic stability struggle to respond to 
these changes. To better understand the changing nature of strategic stability, this 
article draws on different disciplines that also use the concept of strategic stability, 
namely mathematics and ecology. The application of mathematical models to 
strategic stability in the arms control context is not new, given the contribution of 
game theory. In a 1990 mathematical model of strategic stability, a group of Russian 
mathematicians noted the different American and Soviet definitions of strategic 
stability, but defined it themselves as the absence of the capability on either side to 
47 Lieber and Press. 
48 Trachtenberg, p. 210. Trachtenberg also notes that the implications of this were never realized in 
arms control agreements, a gap which continues to exist. 
49 Miles. 
50 Gallagher. 
51 Brustlein, p. 45. 
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serve a disarming blow to the other.52 Parity was preferable to superiority, ‘when both 
sides declare that they are guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability, 
this reasonably rules out the aim of reaching strategic superiority as an outcome of 
such a process.’53 When directly applied to arms control scenarios, therefore, 
mathematical models similarly tend to focus on technical factors. Other models, 
however, such as TIT FOR TAT, which have been applied to arms control, 
demonstrated the value of reciprocity in promoting stability and moves which are not 
necessarily quantitative or technical, but rather are ‘nice’ garner more cooperation and 
prevent competition.54 Applied to international security, this entails a degree of self-
restraint that seemingly challenges a self-help system. 
But strategic stability is also a mathematical concept independent of its application to 
nuclear balancing and deterrence. In much of the mathematics literature, strategic 
stability is associated with equilibrium, such as the Nash Equilibrium, wherein 
another player’s perception is an important variable in assessing stability.55 Kolber 
and Mertens define equilibrium and stability in terms of cooperation – ‘no player can 
increase his payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy’ and stability in a game is 
one in which ‘no player will ever have an incentive to deviate from his prescribed 
strategy’, as determined with the other player in pre-play communication.56 In a 2001 
study, Baliga and Sjostrom applied the Nash Equilibrium to arms races and found 
stability largely depended on a player’s type, which was informed by ‘private 
information.’57 
Ecology is a wholly different field that uses the concept of strategic stability to 
describe a balance in nature, defined as, ‘the ability of a system to return to an 
52 V.A. Gelovani, A. A. Piontkovsky, and A.P. Skerokhodov, ‘Strategic Stability Analysis through 
Mathematical Modeling’, International Political Science Review, 11/2 (Apr., 1990), p. 244. 
53 Ibid, 
54 See, for example, Andrew H. Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006), which uses a Bayesian model to demonstrate how states can build 
trust in arms control over time through a series of games. 
55 Sandeep Baliga and Tomas Sjostrom, ‘Arms Races and Negotiations’, Review of Economic Studies, 
71 (2004), p. 352.
56 Elon Kohlberg and Jean-Francois Mertens, ‘On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria’, Econometrica, 
54:5 (Sept., 1986), p. 1004. 
57 Baliga and Sjostrom, p. 352. 
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equilibrium state after a temporary disturbance.’58 Similar to mathematics, stability is 
closely tied to the concept of equilibrium. Historical notions of stability in ecosystems 
existed when, ‘no changes could be detected in the identities or population sizes of the 
component species of a biotic community.’59 Around the turn of the 20th century, 
however, this approach shifted to a more ‘dynamic’ concept that emphasized 
‘dynamic balance’ and ‘persistence.’ One expert, Orians, provided a useful 
framework of seven ways in which ecologists conceptualize stability: 
(1) Constancy- the lack of change in some parameter;
(2) Persistence- the survival time of a system or some component of it; 
(3) Inertia- the ability of a system to resist external perturbations; 
(4) Elasticity- the speed with which the system returns to its former state; 
(5) Amplitude- the area over which a system is stable; 
(6) Cyclic stability- the ability of a system to cycle or oscillate around some 
central point or zone; 
(7) Trajectory stability- the ability of a system to move towards some final 
end point or zone despite differences in starting points.60
This multidisciplinary approach highlights two traits to inform a new definition of 
strategic stability- equilibrium and equanimity- that can be applied to the study of 
strategic stability in international security. First, strategic stability entails equilibrium, 
a balance wherein no state has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first because of 
the other side’s ability to retaliate.61 Once underlying political tensions are addressed, 
arms control becomes a means of signalling political agreement and ‘self-propels’ 
states to avoid military competition and instead seek out cooperation.62 Second, 
strategic stability is also characterized by equanimity, or the ability of states to avoid 
escalation and return to a state of equilibrium despite perturbations in the international 
system, such as the emergence of new technologies, threats, crises, or conflicts.63 
58 C.S. Holling, ‘Resilience and Stability of Ecological System’, Annual Review of Ecology and 
Systematics, 4 (1973), p. 17. I am extremely grateful to Robert Downes for directing me to the ecology 
literature on this topic. 
59 E.D. McCoy and Kristin Shrader-Frechette, ‘Community Ecology, Scale, and the Instability of the 
Stability Concept’, PSA: Proceeding of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 
1 (1992), p. 184.
60 As described and analysed in McCoy, pp. 186-187. 
61 See, also, Miles for a useful discussion on equilibrium in strategic stability. 
62 Trachtenberg, p. 204. 
63 Miles, p. 424. 
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Cold War theorists inherently recognized the need for states to respond to geopolitical 
shifts with caution, such as Schelling and Halperin’s observation that a system is, 
‘“stable” when political events, internal and external to the countries involved, 
technological change, accidents, false alarms, misunderstandings, crises, limited wars, 
or changes in the intelligence available to both sides, are unlikely to disturb the 
incentives sufficiently to make mutual deterrence fail.’64 In a recent study on the 
concept of strategic stability, Miles similarly concludes, ‘True stability would go 
further by providing mutual restoring forces to drive adversaries to back down- to 
deescalate a crisis, or to revise their aims, or to stop expanding their arsenals, or even 
to reverse an arms buildup.’65 
This multidisciplinary approach highlights the complexity around strategic stability. 
Indeed, hypersonic technology may not necessarily be as destabilising as its critics 
suggest, if possessors, policymakers, and analysts can adopt a more dynamic 
approach to stability. A more nuanced and sanguine approach to strategic stability 
may indeed challenge the general pessimism about emerging technologies as 
suggested by the introduction to this special issue, whereby ‘the fear that emerging 
technologies will necessarily cause sudden and spectacular changes to international 
politics should be treated with caution’- few technologies fundamentally change 
conflict dynamics, and the effects of technology are ‘variegated.’66
What does this mean for arms control? Given that strategic stability is in the eye of 
the beholder and asymmetry is increasingly a trend in international conflict, 
particularly across domains, arms control can respond by adopting the principles of 
dynamism, equilibrium, and equanimity in order to remain a tool for strengthening 
strategic stability. 
Asymmetric Arms Control Framework 
Asymmetry in arms control can take many forms, and any discussion into asymmetric 
options for incorporating emerging technology is at risk of getting muddled without a 
64 Schelling and Halperin, p. 50. 
65 Miles, p. 430. 
66 Todd Sechser, Neil Narang, and Caitlin Talmadge, “Emerging Technologies and Strategic Stability 
in Peacetime, Crisis, and War,” Journal of Strategic Studies (2019).
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more rigorous and structured approach. To address this challenge, the following 
framework examines opportunities for asymmetries in reductions, asymmetries in 
ceilings, and asymmetry across domains within arms control agreements. To 
demonstrate the utility of the typology in exploring opportunities for arms control and 
emerging technology, the discussion includes scenarios for HGV arms control. The 
framework and scenarios are evaluated in the conclusion. It is worthwhile to observe 
at the outset that asymmetry is not a wholly new practice in arms control, nor the 
notion of flexibility in ceilings, as evidenced by the historical examples offered 
here.67 What this framework hopes to do, therefore, is offer a more systematic 
approach to asymmetric arms control in the hopes that it opens intellectual space and 
policy opportunities to manage risks associated with emerging technologies
Asymmetry of reductions 
Under an asymmetry of reductions, states agree to an equal ceiling on capabilities, 
such as ICBMs or aircraft; however, one state is required to make more significant 
reductions than the other to reach those limits. To use a social example, if we both 
agree to limit ourselves to five cups of coffee per week, but I am regularly drinking 
ten glasses whereas you drink six, we feel the effects of this agreement 
asymmetrically (I will cut five cups per week whereas you must abstain from only 
one). Drawing on an example from arms control, the 2010 New START Treaty 
limited the United States and Russia to a shared ceiling of 1550 operationally-
deployed strategic warheads, 700 delivery vehicles, and 800 launchers. But the 
countries’ arsenals were not quantitative (or qualitative) equivalents at the time 
negotiations concluded in 2010, therefore this ceiling created an imbalance in 
reduction requirements. Table 1, American and Russian Reductions Under New 
START, 2011-2018, shows cuts by both countries across delivery vehicles, warheads, 
and launchers based on initial and final data exchanges under the treaty. 
United States Russia
67 I am particularly grateful to the anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point as part of the 
historical legacy of arms control. Examples include Graham T. Allison and Frederin A. Morris, 
‘Armaments and Arms Control’, Daedalus, 104:3 (Summer, 1975); Richard K. Betts, ‘Systems for 
Peace or Causes for War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe’, International 
Security, 17:1 (Summer, 1992), pp. 5-43; and policy recommendations by contemporary experts 
including James Acton and Steven Pifer. 
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Delivery vehicles -230 (882:652) +6 (521:527)
Warheads -450 (1800:1350) -93 (1537:1444)
Launchers -324 (1124:800) -86 (865:779)
Table 1: American and Russian Reductions Under New START, 2011-201868
Table 1 demonstrates that New START was an asymmetry in reductions, wherein the 
United States had to cut 450 warheads, for example, compared to Russia only cutting 
93. Even more stark, Russia actually built up its delivery vehicles in real numbers, 
and was also building up its warhead numbers in the later stages of the treaty, 
although it ultimately settled at a net decrease.69 Albeit not reflected in the reductions 
or the treaty itself, this asymmetry was acceptable because of Russia’s significant 
numerical superiority in tactical nuclear weapons (TNW), meaning that Russia still 
maintained more aggregate nuclear weapons. An asymmetry in reductions could 
implicitly take into account redundant systems or other factors, such as TNW, missile 
defense, or advanced conventional weapons.  
Scenario 1: Bilateral reductions  
Asymmetry of reductions is difficult to conceptualize given that HGVs are still in the 
development phase, therefore there is nothing to reduce at present. Nonetheless, we 
can envision a scenario following a U.S.-Russia HGV arms race, in which they agree 
to reduce to an agreed upon limit, hypothetically 100 vehicles each. Ostensibly, one 
side would have been further along in its development and its HGV technology may 
have a qualitative advantage. Therefore, while Washington and Moscow agree to limit 
themselves to the same number, one makes a smaller cut or is quantitatively better-
off.  
Asymmetry of ceilings 
A second type of asymmetry is in ceilings, whereby states agree to unequal limits. A 
classic nuclear example of this is the SALT Interim Agreement, an important case 
study of attempts to incorporate emerging technology into arms control, namely 
68 U.S. Department of State, ‘New START Fact Sheets’, June 1, 2011 and February 22, 2018, available 
at: https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/rls/164722.htm and 
https://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/278775.htm. 
69 Hans M. Kristensen, ‘New START Data Shows Russian Warhead Increase Before Expected 
Decrease’, Federation of American Scientists, October 3, 2016. 
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multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) and missile defenses. 
SALT is a case of quantitative asymmetry, whereby the United States and Soviet 
Union limited similar capabilities but at different levels, as demonstrated in Table 2, 
American and Soviet Ceilings Under SALT. 
United States Soviet Union 
ICBM silos 1,054 1,607
SLBM launch tubes 710 950
Submarines 44 62
Table 2: American and Soviet Ceilings Under SALT
The SALT Interim Agreement did not require reductions but rather capped existing 
capabilities, allowing for a small cushion to account for launch tubes and submarines 
under construction to replace existing systems. At the outset, the SALT Interim 
Agreement’s stated goals were to, ‘contribute to the creation of more favourable 
conditions for active negotiation on limiting strategic arms as well as to the relaxation 
of international tensions and the strengthening of trust between States….’70 This 
practical approach accounted for ongoing competition in the strategic domain but 
sought to limit the potentially negative impact of emerging technologies on strategic 
stability. 
Asymmetry of ceilings- Scenario 2: Quantitative imbalance  
In this scenario, the United States and Russia would sign a treaty limiting their HGVs 
but at different levels. Ceilings would be agreed to depending on respective stages of 
development in HGV technology, along with plans for HGV deployment in relation to 
nuclear weapons. For example, given Russia’s numerical advantage of TNW and 
development of dual-capable cruise missiles, the United States might be allowed 
slightly higher number of HGVs, or they could adopt a ratio, such as 5:4, based on a 
variety of criteria (e.g. warhead numbers, strategic delivery vehicles, launchers, and 
missile defense). Given that neither side has stated how many HGVs they plan to 
develop or for what purpose, it is impossible to propose even hypothetical ceilings. 
70 Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I), 1972, 
available at: http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/aptsaltI.pdf. 
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Such an exchange would largely depend on HGV ranges, technology, and any 
progress in HGV defense. 
Asymmetry of ceilings- Scenario 3: Hypersonic ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’  
This scenario would use the model of the NPT in which a multilateral agreement 
permitted the United States, Russia, and China to continue to develop and deploy 
HGVs to an agreed limit, and all other states would agree to refrain from doing so. 
Essentially, it would create hypersonic ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. There would be no 
verification, but all states parties would agree to various confidence-building 
measures (CBMs), such as regular consultations and meetings about the risks 
associated with HGVs. This might be thought of as similar to the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol, but with three states having exceptional status. 
Asymmetry of domains
And finally, asymmetry of domains would see states reciprocate reductions but of 
dissimilar capabilities. Essentially these are non-like-for-like exchanges and designed 
to address the challenges of asymmetry and emerging technology. Historical 
examples of asymmetric exchanges across domains to include nuclear weapons are 
relatively limited, with the exception of an option explored amidst negotiation of the 
INF Treaty that was ultimately abandoned. At the time the Soviet Union maintained a 
significant conventional advantage, whereby the realization of nuclear reductions and 
the INF Treaty would leave a strategic imbalance favoring Moscow. To address this, 
Gorbachev floated the idea of unilateral Soviet conventional cuts or asymmetric 
conventional exchanges, which also would have shifted resources to his economic 
priorities. In a study on this idea of asymmetric arms control in 1988, Jack Snyder 
concluded, ‘conventional arms control could contribute to NATO’s security by 
redressing the small imbalance favouring the (Warsaw) Pact at the outset of 
mobilization, and possibility also the somewhat larger imbalance when 
reinforcements from the Western USSR arrive.’71 Snyder offered three scenarios for 
arms control, including ‘armor-for-armor, airpower-for-airpower, or airpower-for 
armor trades’, along with the suggestion that the United States exchange limits on the 
Strategic Defense Initiative, which might induce the Soviets to, ‘make highly 
71 Jack Snyder, ‘Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options’, 
International Security, 12:4 (1988), pp. 65-66. 
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asymmetric conventional cuts, making NATO’s problem easier to solve.’72 
Ultimately, the Soviet Union made unilateral cuts under Gorbachev in 1988 and 
asymmetric cuts were never formally negotiated. 
A final historical example of asymmetry of domains is the arms control process that 
accompanied the Dayton peace accords, the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms 
Control which placed limits on five types of weapons across two domains (land and 
air) for three principle countries, one of which included two subsidiary groups. The 
Sub-Regional Agreement recognized, ‘arms control is essential to creating a stable 
peace in the region.’73 Table 3, Actual and Allowed Armaments Under the Sub-
Regional Arms Cont ol Agreement, compares reductions (and buildups) across 
domains and weapon types as part of the post-conflict peace process. 
Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia
Croatia Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
(Federation)
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
(Srpska)
Tanks 1300/1025 400/410 135/273 330/137
Armored Combat 
Vehicles
1000/850 300/340 80/227 400/113
Artillery 4000/3750 1700/1500 1500/1000 1600/500
Combat Aircraft 280/155 20/62 0/41 40/21
Helicopters 110/53 30/21 12/14 30/7
Table 3: Actual/Allowed Armaments under the Sub-Regional Arms Control 
Agreement74 
Table 3 shows that the Sub-Regional Agreement included asymmetry on multiple 
levels, including reductions, ceilings, and domains. For example, while the Bosnia-
Herzegovina Federation was permitted to build up its number of combat aircraft from 
zero to 41, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic of Srpska was required to reduce from 
72 iBid., p. 50. 
73 ‘Measure for Sub-Regional Arms Control’, available at: 
https://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/dayton/52579.htm.  
74 Compiled from McCaulsand; Michael O’Hanlon, ‘Arms control and military stability in the 
Balkans’, Arms Control Today, 26:6 (1996); and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘Agreement on Sub-regional Arms Control: Article IV’, 15 June 
1996, available at: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110721101240/http://arhiva.morh.hr/hvs/SPORAZUMI/tekstovi/SSKN-
engleski.pdf. Additionally, allotments for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation were further divided 
between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, see O’Hanlon. 
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40 to 21.75 The agreement was initially based on a 5:2:2 ratio, ‘basing allotments of 
weapons primarily on relative populations’, and entailed CBMs, such as the right to 
observe large-scale exercises and inspection of 10-20% of treaty limited items.76 
Admittedly, there are challenges with comparing arms control in small arms and a 
regional post-conflict scenario to the challenges of limiting competition in U.S.-
Russia-China advanced conventional weapons. Following the Dayton Accords, states 
parties had powerful patrons that were committed to training and re-equipping their 
client states, which had the potential to undermine the peace process and violate the 
agreements.77 These patrons served an important role as a backstop to the peace 
agreement which would be missing in any U.S.-Russia-China HGV grand bargain. 
Second, the 1996 Sub-Regional Agreement included multiple states and intra-state 
groups, which complicated negotiations and, according to O’Hanlon, made it hard ‘to 
know whose arms quota should equal whose’, creating uncertainty about how the 
agreement would respond to external pressures.78 Such challenges would be 
exacerbated at the global level among the leaders in strategic weapons. And finally, 
the conventional arms control cases offered here occurred in vastly different 
geopolitical contexts than the current climate. In the case of New START, SALT, and 
INF, the United States and Soviet Union were experiencing an era of rapprochement 
and the asymmetric options were part of a package of other arms control discussions. 
All the scenarios offered here face limitations, but they also offer a creative approach 
to adapt arms control to emerging technologies and strategic stability that includes 
nuclear and non-nuclear components. 
Asymmetry of domains- Scenario 4: Cross-domain CBMs 
Under the terms of scenario 4, the United States, Russia, and China, would agree to a 
series of CBM dialogues on HGVs and how these would be incorporated into existing 
strategic forces and planning. It would include reciprocal transparency measures, such 
as demonstrations and military-to-military dialogues. The three states would not agree 
to any limits on HGVs, but rather would cooperate specifically in discussing HGVs as 
75 O’Hanlon.
76 iBid. 
77 McCaulsand, p. 23. 
78 O’Hanlon, p. 6. 
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they relate to other domains, particularly nuclear. This scenario would also include a 
joint declaration not to use HGVs to target each other’s nuclear forces. 
Asymmetry of domains- Scenario 5: Bilateral ratios    
Scenario 5 is a more ambitious approach to U.S.-Russia strategic arms control, 
building on lessons learned from a wide variety of historical examples but in the same 
trend of START and New START to include a high level of technical detail, 
inspections, and recognition of offense-defense balance. It would entail a legally-
binding agreement to the following: 
 A 10:1 ratio of all existing nuclear delivery vehicles (intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, bombers, cruise missiles, and 
shorter-range aircraft) to include HGVs. 
 Of the HGVs allow d, only 25% could be nuclear-capable. 
 HGVs cannot be co-located with nuclear delivery systems. 
 On-site verification, data exchange, and a consultative committee. 
 Declaratory statement that HGVs will never be used to target nuclear forces. 
Asymmetry of domains- Scenario 6: Two-Stage Limitations  
In the final scenario, the United States and Russia would agree to an overall limit of 
1000 nuclear warheads on 600 delivery vehicles, to include HGVs, TNW, and 
strategic delivery vehicles. A similar format was adopted for New START itself, 
whereby conventionally-armed ballistic missiles are counted under the treaty and 
cannot exceed 700 in total, along with their warheads which fall under the 1550 
ceiling.79 This applies to conventional weapons with a ballistic trajectory for the 
majority of its flight time, however Russia, interestingly, did not ask for similar 
restraints on conventional boost-glide weapons.80 
Under this scenario, reductions would take place over two phases. In the first phase, 
both sides would start the process of reducing their nuclear forces to reach the agreed 
limits by a set date. In the second phase, when HGVs are fully developed and 
deployed, the United States and Russia would make further reductions to their nuclear 
79 Amy Woolf, ‘Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background 
and Issues’, Congressional Research Service, 2017.  
80 James M. Acton, ‘Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons’, Nonproliferation Review, 22/2 
(2015), pp. 141-154.
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forces so as to compensate for the additional HGVs into their ceiling limits, but these 
reductions in nuclear forces would be asymmetric depending on force posture and 
decisions about how many HGVs to deploy and allow for flexibility on both sides. 
Unlike New START, however, China would join the agreement at a 5:1 ratio in both 
nuclear warheads and strategic delivery vehicles to the United States and Russia to 
account for the current imbalance in strategic forces. 
Conclusion: Arms Control Dynamism 
The goal of this final section is to evaluate the asymmetric arms control framework, 
the scenarios for HGV asymmetric arms control, and to identify scope for further 
research. At least four trends emerge from the application of the asymmetric arms 
control framework to HGVs. First, HGVs are a trilateral issue. In the bilateral 
scenarios discussed here, such as scenarios 1 and 5, China may see this as an 
opportunity to gain a strategic advantage and build up its HGV arsenal. This, in turn, 
jeopardizes the sustainability of any agreement whereby both Washington and 
Moscow may become increasingly uneasy with this imbalance outside of the treaty 
for fear of an ‘HGV gap’. This correlates to the new challenge to strategic stability 
presented by asymmetries and emerging technologies; indeed, arms control is no 
longer a purely strategic bilateral dynamic. 
Second, arms control does not happen in a political vacuum. Rather it is a 
manifestation of political processes and changes, albeit states have some ability to 
shape those processes. Any scenario that entails an asymmetry in ceilings is  
politically unfeasible at present, whereby one side would be required to accept a 
lower number, which would exacerbate fears of vulnerability and increase incentives 
for pre-emptive first strikes. Jacquelyn Schneider has demonstrated how emerging 
technologies can exacerbate these perceptions of vulnerability in the 
capability/vulnerability paradox, whereby the revolution in military technology 
creates ‘novel vulnerabilities’ that could increase incentives for first strike.81 This 
aspect of emerging technology adds an additional level of complexity for efforts to 
apply arms control. 
81 Jacquelyn Schneider, ‘The Capability/Vulnerability Paradox and Military Revolutions: Implications 
for Computing, Cyber, and the Onset of War,’ Journal of Strategic Studies (2019).
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Numerical imbalances also present domestic political challenges. In cases of 
asymmetry in ceilings, any agreement permitting Russia a higher number of 
capabilities relative to the United States would not be palatable to Congress or to the 
national security stakeholders committed to, ‘the task to ensure that American 
military superiority endures….’82 Additionally, while scenario 5 crosses domains and 
offers transparency and predictability, renegotiating the details of such an agreement 
would be politically and technically onerous. Arms control is also influenced by 
external political factors and the broader geopolitical context. Many of the scenarios 
here could be unfavorably perceived by U.S. allies as a signal of waning commitment 
to it deterrence and assurance missions. Scenario 3, in particular, would be politically 
unfeasible given the enduring controversy around the two-tiered system of the NPT 
and other states would be reluctant to join a similarly-structured agreement in which 
all states are not treated as quals. Scenario 3, with ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, would not 
limit the arms race between th  United States, Russia, and China, nor would it reduce 
the risks of misperception in a crisis absent more robust transparency measures and 
reciprocal limits. 
Perhaps the most important theme from the asymmetric arms control framework is to 
incorporate dynamism, an important concept in the multidisciplinary literature on 
strategic stability, to account for changes in the environment. Dynamism can be 
practiced in arms control by allowing for flexibility in force posturing and the treaty 
itself, ‘to allow consensual changes in the obligations imposed in order to fulfill the 
object of the treaty in uncertain conditions. Dynamic obligations arise under 
agreements that allow the parties to mutually adjust commitments while maintaining a 
shared perception of reciprocal responsibility.’83 Applied to emerging technologies, 
dynamism in arms control can focus on managing rather than stopping the arms race, 
allowing for the political realities that inspire competition in military capabilities but 
preventing its destabilizing effects. This was an important component of SALT, for 
example, and in scenarios 1, 5, and 6 above by allowing a cushion in numerical limits 
for systems currently under construction.
82 U.S. National Security Strategy, 2017, p. 3. 
83 Edwin Smith, ‘Understanding Dynamic Obligations: Arms Control Agreements’, Southern 
California Law Review, 64 (1991), p. 1557. 
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There may also be prospects for flexibility and dynamism in the formality of treaties. 
A current debate in arms control literature is whether or not it must be legally-binding 
or could be more informal agreements. Sarah Kreps, for example, has observed:
International negotiators might be better served drafting less highly legalized 
agreements that offer latitude in states' commitment to the agreement, since 
the prospect of tying their hands will discourage states from engaging in 
higher-obligation commitments. Backing away from aggressive delegation 
measures might also help states buy into an agreement, a dynamic illustrated 
by experiences of Cold War arms control negotiations in which the Soviets in 
particular were leery of the intrusiveness of on-site inspections.84 
Conversely, O’Connell’s historical analysis argues that the legal nature of treaties 
offers the most benefit for international security with predictability in an era of 
uncertainty.85 Is cross-domain arms control, to include asymmetries, better served by 
informal and flexible agreements, or does it necessitate legally-binding treaties with 
verification?  
Potential criticisms of the framework resonate with historical arguments that arms 
control did not do what it promised86, favored the superpowers at the expense of all 
other states87, and offering limited tangible gains aside from economic savings. 88 And 
more recently, Gallagher arraigned technical or quantitative approaches to strategic 
stability, which could also apply to these options for arms control: 
[A] predominantly technical way to make deterrence more stable by changing 
force structure characteristics, military operations, relative numbers of 
weapons on either side, or total number of nuclear weapons gives short shrift 
to political factors, including the fundamental assumptions about world 
politics that inform different arms control logics, the quality of political 
relations among leading states, and the political processes that affect 
negotiation, ratification, and implementation.89
Many criticisms of arms control, however, fail to acknowledge its inter-relationship 
with international security more broadly and treat it as a false binary of either 
technical/quantitative or political/qualitative. The asymmetric options here are meant 
84 Kreps, p. 18. 
85 O’Connell.  
86 Colin S. Gray, ‘Arms Control Does Not Control Arms’, Orbis, 37/3 (1993), pp. 333-348. 
87 Hedley Bull, ‘Arms Control and World Order’, International Security, 1/1 (1976), pp. 3-16. 
88 Bernard Brodie, ‘On the Objectives of Arms Control’, International Security, 1/1 (1976), p. 19. 
89 Gallagher, p. 469. 
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to capture both quantitative and qualitative factors, and provide various options 
depending on political conditions and technological developments. Implementing the 
principles of dynamism, of the scenarios highlighted by this framework, the most 
useful approach may be a combination of Scenario 4 CBMs leading to Scenario 6, 
two-stage limitations. 
Ultimately states engage in arms control when it is in the national interest. At present, 
technical and political hurdles limit options for incorporating emerging technologies 
into arms control; however, expanding the objectives of strategic stability and arms 
control opens creative approaches for addressing asymmetries in capabilities and 
domains. This challenges the conventional wisdom that strategic stability and arms 
control are out-dated Cold War practices. Indeed, history demonstrates that 
opportunities for arms control often arise unexpectedly and creative visions that cross 
domains and combine informal approaches with multi-stage agreements can lay the 
groundwork for when political conditions become more favourable for cooperation. 
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